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What Drives Sports TV Rights? A Comparative Analysis of their Evolution 
in English and French Men’s Football First Divisions, 1980-2020 
This article consists of a comparative analysis of the evolution of TV rights in English 
Premier League and French Ligue 1 men’s football over the 1980-2020 period. It aims 
to understand the differences in this evolution in both leagues. It first reviews the 
literature on football TV rights in Europe then the history of pay-TV football in the UK 
and France. A framework to be tested is then suggested with the identification of 16 
independent variables. Correlations are calculated between these variables and TV 
rights in England and France to test whether the suggested framework is supported by 
empirical evidence. These correlations enable to explain why TV rights for the Premier 
League have become much larger than for the Ligue 1. They show that the main driver 
for TV rights is the main domestic broadcaster’s turnover. They also enable the 
identification of a virtuous circle for the Premier League. 
Introduction 
Over the 2016-2019 period, the English Premier League (EPL) TV rights reached a record 
£8.336 – £5.136bn from national rights,1 £3.2bn from foreign rights 2– likely to be overcome 
over the 2019-2022 period despite the decrease in national rights (estimated at £4.655bn, 
£4.555bn from Sky and British Telecom3, £0.1bn from Amazon4) thanks to the continuing 
growth in foreign rights.5 These £2.8bn per season have to be compared with the annual 
£2.6m (£8.7m in constant prices) for the 1983-1985 period, when the first televised live 
English Football League (EFL) matches were shown.6 This indicates the dramatic increase in 
TV rights for English football from the 1980s, also true to a lesser extent in French football. 
Indeed, national TV rights for the latter have increased from €0.8m (€1.5m in constant prices) 
in 1984-1985 to €748.5m per season over the 2016-2020 period.7 If football TV rights are 
currently very large and represent a main source of revenues for clubs, the amounts in the 
1980s remind that this has not always been the case. TV rights have become more and more 
important for football clubs over time and a key factor to generate a competitive advantage 
 
 
for a national football league compared to its competitors. This is an essential aspect in the 
European context where football clubs from different national leagues are in contention in 
continental competitions (Champions League and Europa League). Some important elements 
are to understand why football TV rights have benefited from such a huge increase since the 
1980s but also why different national leagues have benefited and benefit currently from 
differing amounts of TV rights. 
In this article, the objective is to compare the evolution of TV rights in English and 
French men’s football first divisions over the 1980-2020 period. A comparative analysis on 
sports broadcasting markets has proved to be insightful.8 The justifications for the 
comparison between the English and French leagues are that the UK and French markets are 
quite similar in terms of overall population (respectively 66m and 66.8m inhabitants in 2017 
according respectively to ONS and INSEE) and gross domestic product (respectively $39,800 
and $39,932 per capita in 2017 according to the International Monetary Fund).9 This has been 
true since the beginning and over the period studied with respectively 56.3m and 53.7m 
inhabitants and $22,000 and $27,000 per capita (according to Trading Economics) in 1980, 
and 58.9m inhabitants for both markets and $36,000 and $39,000 per capita in 2000. The 
demographic structure has also some similarities with one urban area largely more populated 
than the others (more than 10m inhabitants in London in 2015 in the UK according to City 
Population, more than 12m inhabitants in Paris in 2013 in France according to INSEE) and 
several other urban areas with more than or around 1m inhabitants (4 in the UK in 2015 
according to ONS, 6 in France in 2013 according to INSEE). With regards to TV rights, 
broadcast live games appeared almost at the same time in both territories, i.e. in the first half 
of the 1980s. Since then, the English professional football industry has been characterised by 
a significant shift in its organisation and administration.10 French football has also 
encountered a number of changes over the period studied.11 The English and French leagues 
 
 
are also similar in terms of structure with 20 clubs playing 38 games each over a season. The 
number of clubs and games has always been quite similar over the period, i.e. between 18 and 
22 clubs and 34 and 42 games per club. Last, both leagues have been characterised by the 
existence of an ‘historic’ domestic broadcaster, Sky for the EPL in the UK and Canal+ for the 
Ligue 1 in France. 
The structure of the article is as follows. The first section briefly reviews the literature 
on football TV rights in Europe. The second section describes the history of pay-TV football 
in the UK and France. The third section provides the framework to be tested so as to analyse 
the evolution of TV rights in English and French football with the identification of the criteria 
we focus on. The fourth section describes the methodology used. The fifth section presents 
the results along with their discussion. The sixth and last section concludes. 
Literature on Football TV Rights in Europe 
The examples of the English Premier League and the French Ligue 1 illustrate the start of 
league games being broadcast live in the 1980s and the rise of football TV rights since then in 
Europe, having led to a growing academic interest, mainly since the 2000s. In 2001, Cave 
and Crandall published an article comparing the competition and efficiency issues in the 
United States and Europe, focusing mainly on the UK for the latter.12 In 2002, Boyle and 
Haynes wrote an essay on some of the changes induced by the new media (particularly the 
internet, digital television and mobile telephony) in the UK football industry.13 During the 
2000s, three other important contributions to the literature have been the books written by 
Boyle and Haynes,14 edited by Jeanrenaud and Késenne15 as well as written by Gratton and 
Solberg.16 In the former, the authors develop further their analysis of the impact of media 
change on the football industry, with a chapter on the European dimension (e.g. the case of 
Italy), although their book tackles mainly the UK. In the second aforementioned book, the 
 
 
chapter by Andreff and Bourg focuses on the impact of TV rights redistribution schemes on 
competitive balance in European football,17 while the chapter by Szymanski asks the question 
‘Why have premium sports rights migrated to pay TV in Europe but not in the US?’18 In the 
latter aforementioned book, Gratton and Solberg provide an in depth analysis of the factors 
explaining the amounts reached by TV rights, illustrating their analysis with data from North 
American and European leagues, especially the English Premier League for the latter. 
 The 2010s have also seen a continual academic interest in football TV rights in 
Europe. Of particular note is the book by Evens, Iosifidis and Smith.19 Indeed, it covers a 
number of national case studies across the world, including Italy, Spain and the UK. 
However, it does not engage with a comparative analysis. The authors rely on such a 
comparative analysis in an article published in 2015, with a comparison of the regulation of 
television sports broadcasting in different countries across the world, including Italy and the 
UK.20 It is worth noting that these authors do not focus specifically on football but still 
provide insights into this sport. Although not explicitly on football, their article published in 
2016 analyses the increasingly prominent position of traditional telecommunications 
companies in the contemporary sports media rights market with examples from the UK 
(British Telecom), Germany (Deutsche Telekom), France (France Telecom/Orange) and 
Spain (Telefonica) through companies involved in football.21 
The latter article does not deal with Italy, the focus of the article published by Di 
Betta and Amenta on the business model of professional football.22 The authors compare the 
individual and collective sales of broadcasting rights (the former having been in place in Italy 
until 2010) and conclude that, while reducing revenue inequality, the latter institutional 
design distorts allocative efficiency and informational rent appropriation, opens up costly ex 
post renegotiations and antitrust litigations, and does not improve competitive balance. 
Another important contribution to the literature looking at business models is the article 
 
 
published by Boyle on the position of copyright in the arena of sports content rights and 
property rights of sporting organisations as a highly contested area of legal and commercial 
interest in the digital age.23 The author identifies the ramifications of this debate for the 
existing business models for both rights holders (English Premier League and UEFA) and 
broadcasters. More recently, the article by Butler and Massey asks the question ‘Has 
competition in the market for subscription sports broadcasting benefited consumers?’ with a 
focus on the English Premier League,24 while Feuillet, Scelles and Durand investigate the 
existence of a winner’s curse in the bidding process for broadcasting rights in football 
through the cases of the French and UK markets.25 As such, they deal with the same markets 
as the present paper, although their focus is different. 
The History of Pay-TV Football in the UK and France 
Due to some similarities in the UK and France, the history of pay-TV football in these two 
countries is tackled in a single section. More exactly, we mainly stress the UK case and draw 
the similarities (or contrasts) with France. 
The economic history of the relationship between television and sport in the UK is 
long and well established.26 This symbiotic relationship, where sport provides a valued form 
of content to media organisations who provide valued revenue to sport, has become what 
Rowe has characterised as a ‘match made in heaven’.27 As Evens, Iosifidis and Smith have 
suggested,28 following Kuhn,29 this symbiotic relationship has had three phases of gestation: 
firstly, a public service monopoly/duopoly first dominated by the BBC and subsequently 
shared with the commercial regional franchises of ITV; second, following deregulation and 
privatisation of telecommunications under the 1984 Cable and Broadcasting Act and the 1990 
Broadcasting Act, British television saw a period of expansion from the early 1980’s to the 
mid-1990’s with new free-to-air broadcasters Channel 4 (1982) and Channel 5 (1997) and 
 
 
new cable and direct-to-home satellite services, most notably British Sky Broadcasting 
(1990); thirdly, the more recent phase driven by digital television delivery systems across 
digital terrestrial, digital cable and digital satellite licences. As we shall discuss below, we 
may now add a fourth phase of UK television development which includes Internet television 
services, with video-on-demand services and ‘over-the-top’ (OTT) services being developed 
in a period that Hutchins and Rowe have labelled ‘Networked Media Sport’ in an age of 
‘digital plenitude’.30 
Similar phases can be identified in the French case: firstly, a public monopoly on 
broadcasting from 1945 to 1974 with the Radiodiffusion Française (RDF) until 1949 then the 
Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (RTF) until 1964 and the Office de Radiodiffusion-
Télévision Française (ORTF) until 1974 before the ORTF fractured in 1975 in three TV 
channels (TF1, Antenne 2 and FR3) but, as underlined by Bourg, ‘competition is weak 
because all three pertain to public service, are not commercial companies and they agree to 
harmonise their schedule (sharing of sports broadcasts on weekend with Saturday reserved 
for Antenne 2 and Sunday for TF1)’;31 second, the evolution of the French television market 
towards a competitive business with the lifting of the ceiling on advertising revenue for 
channels,32 and the notable arrival of a fourth TV channel in 1984, namely Canal+; and a 
third and fourth phases comparable to the UK case. 
Sport, as a form of content that delivers a ‘ready-made audience’, has arguably played 
a central role in the evolution and development of each of these phases of television. 
However, the impact of each phase of television has been motivated by quite divergent 





Early TV Sport and Duopoly 
The first phase of television reminds us what the economic transaction between television 
and sport actually is. In the UK, the BBC paid for a facility fee for the ‘right’ to place their 
cameras at sport as early as 1937, but it was not until the 1950’s that such fees became 
regularised in the contractual arrangements between television and sport.33 The ‘rights’ in 
question are not intellectual property rights, but a right of access in to the sporting arena to 
broadcast the event. Governing bodies of sport were, for many years, nervous of the impact 
of television on their gate receipts, and for a while were particularly worried about what was 
termed the ‘rediffusion’ of television in public places, such as cinemas. The football 
authorities were especially concerned, and kept live coverage to a handful of occasions such 
as the FA Cup final, European club competitions and international matches.34 Similar 
concerns existed in France. From 1964-1965, televised live matches occurred in French 
football. However, on 8 November 1969, Lyon-Rennes which was televised live took place in 
front of only 894 attendees.35 This led to the end of televised live matches in French football 
for 15 years. 
As television developed, the rights of access became increasingly competitive in the 
UK as each broadcaster sought ‘exclusivity’ to cover events. However, to the early regulators 
of broadcasting exclusivity was deemed antithetical to the broader need to develop the 
medium among the British population, so to avoid the monopolisation of sport events the 
Postmaster General introduced an agreed set of ‘listed events’ of major sporting occasions 
which were deemed to be in the national interest.36 The net effect of this list was to suppress 
the value of ‘facility fees’ for the right to televise major events, where both the BBC and ITV 
shared coverage. This state of affairs structured the duopoly of the BBC/ITV cartel from the 
mid-1950s to the late-1980s. Competition centred on a ratings war between the two channels 
televising the same events and leagues, rather than a battle over exclusivity. The cosy-
 
 
duopoly over rights was broken in a significant way when ITV bought exclusive rights to live 
First Division football matches in a four-year deal with the Football League worth £44m from 
1988 to 1992.   
Deregulation and the Rise of Pay-TV Sport 
In the second phase of television, especially following the launch of Sky, the value of 
economic rents to televise football took a dramatic turn in the UK. The fortuitous confluence 
of a newly formed elite English Premier League (organised in the economic interests of a 
smaller group of 20 clubs rather than the 92 members of the Football League) and the content 
hungry new pay-TV broadcaster led to a series of exclusive television deals that dwarfed 
previous contracts for live coverage of football: £191.5m (1992-97) and £670m (1997-01) in 
this phase of expansion. The popularity of live football on Sky Sports transformed a company 
that was making a £47m loss in 1992 in to a company making £67m profits a year later.37  
Economically, the new cash injection in to the sport helped finance the modernisation 
of football stadiums across the country, as well as inflate the salaries of leading footballers.38 
With increased volumes of money circulating in the world of English football the game also 
attracted new investors in clubs, many of whom had moved out of private ownership to 
public companies with shares trading on the stock market. Among the investors were media 
companies themselves, with Sky, the cable operator NTL, and ITV franchise holder Granada 
among the largest investors in clubs, and the management of their media assets.39 The 
investment by media companies was partly triggered by regulatory investigations, first by the 
Office of Fair Trading in 1999 which focused on competition issues related to the collective 
sale of TV rights to Premier League football, and second, by the European Commission 
whose competition directorate DG4 also found the joint sale of rights to be a ‘horizontal 
restriction of competition’.40 The prospect of clubs selling their own television rights led the 
 
 
Rupert Murdoch backed Sky to launch a £625m takeover bid for the leading club of the 
period Manchester United in 1998. Although this may have seemed a shrewd strategic 
decision to control media rights of the Premier League’s leading club, the move proved 
highly controversial with fans and ultimately the regulator the Monopolies and Mergers 
Commission who intervened and prevented the sale on ‘public interest’ grounds. This is in 
contrast with the French case where Canal Plus was allowed to own Paris-Saint-Germain as 
developed below. Soon after, the OFT ruled that the competitive market for the collective 
sale of Premier League rights ultimately benefited the consumer, but the leagues dispute with 
the EC rumbled on in to the third phase of British television. 
With regards to the second phase of British television, some similarities can be drawn 
with the French case where TV rights also increased, although Canal+ enjoyed a monopsony 
until the end of the 1990s, meaning a situation of bilateral monopoly between the French 
football league and Canal+. The latter understood that a rivalry for the title between two clubs 
from large markets was needed to optimize TV audiences. At the end of the 1980s / 
beginning of the 1990s, Olympique de Marseille (second French market with Lyon behind 
Paris) was the best French club and one of the best European club, reaching the Champions 
Cup final in 1991 and winning the Champions League (the new name of the former 
Champions Cup) in 1993. Its strongest opponent was Monaco (coached by Arsène Wenger), 
a market which was not optimal with less than 100,000 inhabitants. Canal+ decided to inject 
money in Paris-Saint-Germain and became shareholders in 1991. The TV channel wished to 
create a rivalry with Marseille which was compromised by a corruption issue for the latter in 
1993 (they paid players from Valenciennes to let them win a game) then their administrative 
relegation in second division in 1994 and their insolvency in 1995, preventing them to be 




The Rise of Digital Platforms and Competition for Pay-TV Sport 
Digital television, the third phase of television development, radically broadened the 
spectrum of available channels and created the potential for more competition in the 
television marketplace. In the UK, a new competitor to Sky’s dominance in football rights 
was ONDigital, later to be rebranded ITV Digital. Launched in November 1998 ONDigital 
was the new digital terrestrial television (DTT) license holder, and saw television rights to 
football as a key strategic aim to gain a foothold in the pay-TV marketplace alongside 
satellite and cable broadcasters. In June 2000 the television rights for the Premier League, the 
FA Cup and the Football League all came up for auction, in what turned in to a rights feeding 
frenzy among the new digital television services Sky, NTL/CableTel and ONDigital. Sky 
won the rights to the Premier League for a record fee of £1.2bn, they also picked up the FA 
Cup and England national matches, and in an effort to win at least one of the rights packages 
ONDigital bought the rights to the Football League for £315m, four times the previous deal 
with Sky. The inflated cost proved the undoing of the DTT provider which had changed name 
to ITV Digital, which hit by escalating costs and falling revenues went in to administration in 
June 2002, only one year in to the three-year television deal with the Football League. 
Litigation to redeem the remainder of the fee from ITV Digital’s creditors ultimately failed 
due to a lack of parent company guarantees from Carlton and Granada, which left many 
Football League clubs facing financial ruin and administration.41  
Sky’s success in seeing off competition from a rival pay-TV service was soon 
checked again by the European competition commissioner’s ruling on collecting sale of rights 
by the Premier League. The ruling failed to effect the 2004 rights sale which Sky won for 
£1.024bn over a three year period, but in 2007 the Premier League were forced to break up 
their rights bundle in to smaller tranches to enable wider competition for TV rights from 
other providers. Irish company Setanta successfully bid for a share of the Premier League 
 
 
rights from 2007-2010 for total fee of £1.7bn, continuing the inflationary spiral of Premier 
League TV rights. As Setanta sought to broaden their presence in the television sports market 
they bought rights to Scottish football, the FA Cup and England games, Premier Rugby and 
the PGA Tour among others. However, the cost of servicing the debt on the capital required 
to pay for the TV rights deals ultimately became too great, and in 2009 the company ceased 
trading in the UK and its various TV deals to football were auctioned off cheaply to US 
sports network ESPN. As with the collapse of ITV Digital before it, Setanta’s demise left 
significant financial holes in the budgets of major sports organisations, and football clubs, 
and left Sky to maintain its hegemony in the television football market. 
Some similarities can be found in the French case, although no TV channel went into 
administration. In 1999, TPS won the right to broadcast some French games, ending the 
monopsony of Canal+. However, the latter recovered its exclusivity for the 2005-2008 period 
with an offer of €600m per season then absorbed its competitor. French football was under 
the threat that Canal+ – which stopped its ownership of Paris-Saint-Germain in 2006 – 
became alone again on the supply side and reduced its next offer, similar to Sky in the UK in 
2004. Canal+ indeed reduced its offer for the 2008-2012 period (€465m per season) but 
Orange (telecommunication company) emerged on the supply side and won the right to 
broadcast some French games for an offer of €203m per season, meaning that the overall TV 
rights continued to grow. The entry of Orange on the market is related to the fourth phase of 
television. 
Developments in Internet Protocol Television and New Markets/Competition for TV 
Sport 
The beginnings of what might be characterised as a fourth phase of television centres on the 
development of Internet Protocol Television (IPTV) services which began to be marketed in 
the UK and in France during the first decade of the 21st century when telecommunications 
 
 
companies, such as BT Vision and Orange, began to provide television packages using their 
broadband service from 2006 and 2003, respectively. 
BT Vision carried live pay-TV football via deals with Setanta and subsequently 
ESPN, and from Sky Sports following a ruling by regulator Ofcom in July 2010 which forced 
Sky to reduce the wholesale price of its premium sports channels by 23.4% which were 
previously viewed as a form of restrictive practice against competitors. Buoyed by renewed 
competition in sports rights, BT’s most significant move in the world of televised football 
came in 2012 when it successfully won the rights to 38 live Premier League matches per 
season from 2013-16. Most crucially, this included the right for 18 ‘first choice’ matches. 
This initial deal, worth £738m, was modestly expanded further to 42 games per season from 
2016-2019 for £960m. The most dramatic strategic change to live football rights in the UK 
came with BT Sports exclusive acquisition of UEFA Champions League games in 2013 for 
£897m. The move broke nearly two decades of dominance by ITV and Sky in the coverage of 
the competition in the UK, and moved BT in alignment with Sky in terms of its attractiveness 
to pay-TV customers. 
The fierce competition for television rights to premium football between Sky and BT 
has emphasised the importance of sport to drive new customers in to their businesses. BT’s 
key strategic move has been to bundle its sports channel offering free with broadband and 
telephony services. This ‘triple play’ of television, broadband and telephony now 
characterises the entertainment and telecommunications market in the UK, where inflated 
rights to premium sport content has become a ‘loss leader’ to lucrative digital media 
household markets which are now more complex and diverse in their offers. In to this new 
digital media landscape global Internet corporations such as Google (via YouTube), 
Facebook, Netflix and Amazon are also competing to deliver Video-on-Demand and Over-
The-Top services which also have the capacity to stream or broadcast live sports content. In 
 
 
this respect, the market for premium live televised football in the UK is likely to remain 
complex and constantly in flux for the foreseeable future. 
By contrast with the UK case, Orange stopped to broadcast French football games in 
2012. Once again, French football was under the threat of Canal Plus recovering its 
monopsony but the Qatari channel Al-Jazeera (become BeIN) arrived in the French market 
when Qatar Tourism Authority became owner of Paris-Saint-Germain in 2011. 
Framework to Be Tested 
The framework to be tested is based on the core claims below for a domestic TV channel and 
a domestic league, some of them derived from previous literature. The main variables we will 
focus on in the following analysis are numbered and in bold. Initially, we consider that the 
domestic TV channel is alone on the domestic market or has largely more market power than 
the other domestic channels and no real domestic competition but is in indirect competition 
with foreign channels to enable the domestic league to attract the best players. More 
specifically, its starting point is to meet the demand from domestic TV viewers that can be 
considered as watching the best possible matches, preferentially in their domestic league and 
with domestic players: 
 So as to meet the demand from TV viewers, the TV channel’s objective is to 
broadcast the best possible matches thus the best clubs and players in the world 
(1),42 including the best domestic players (2).43 
 Having the best players requires being able to pay the best salaries so domestic clubs 
needs more revenue than foreign clubs (to simplify, we do not consider domestic 
taxes). 
 A TV channel is ready to spend more money if it has the financial ability (3) to do 
so, the football domestic league is a core product (4) for it and this allows domestic 
 
 
clubs to attract the best players in the world, meaning that these clubs must already 
have revenue comparable or close to foreign clubs. 
 As a consequence, domestic clubs need large investments and revenue beyond 
domestic TV rights (5) to attract even more of the latter. 
 In particular, domestic clubs need large stadium attendance (6), which is also 
required for telegenic purposes (along with a stadium appropriate for broadcasting) 
thus by the TV channel since a large crowd is more likely to generate a great 
atmosphere with a positive impact on TV viewers’ experience.44 
 Having the best clubs and players should lead to continental competitiveness (7) for 
its domestic league, which should increase its perceived quality by TV viewers and 
sporting prizes (a better continental performance means more positions qualifying for 
the European competitions in the domestic league) thus be beneficial for the TV 
channel. 
 Continental competitiveness may also be required per se by the TV channel as it may 
broadcast continental matches and their audiences are better with successful domestic 
clubs. 
 Eventually, we reintroduce competition between TV channels so a TV channel also 
needs to offer more money than its domestic competitors (8) to get TV rights. 
For a domestic league: 
 Its objective is to have the best possible matches and competitive clubs in continental 
competitions, consistent with TV channels and viewers’ expectations. 
 Competitive domestic clubs in continental competitions can require that a few clubs 
or even only one club – the driving force (9) – has the best players, contradictory 
 
 
with the necessity of outcome uncertainty which is well documented in the 
literature,45 and especially the necessity of uncertainty for the title (10).46 
 The league needs a sufficiently equalitarian sharing of its TV rights to generate 
outcome uncertainty and / or to limit its number of clubs (11) so as to avoid that 
some have too limited financial resources compared to others and / or to make sure 
that its best clubs will benefit from a large amount of TV rights. Besides, fewer clubs 
means fewer matchdays, which is better for TV channels as it is likely that more 
matches will be played on weekends with a positive impact on audiences.47 
 The league needs to optimise its TV rights to be able to have both competitive and 
relatively equal clubs, at least for its best clubs. 
 TV rights optimisation needs domestic but also international TV rights optimisation 
with the selling and marketing of these rights by sports promoters operating in an 
increasingly global marketplace.48 
 International TV rights optimisation requires reaching a maximum number of 
countries. 
 Reaching a maximum number of countries is partially consistent with having the best 
players in the world (reaching the countries with the best players in the world) but 
also suggests attracting players from markets with high potential for TV rights 
(12),49 even if these players are not among the best in the world. It is worth noting that 
this strategy can be temporal: once a market is interested in a league, it may be not 
necessary to attract players coming from this market anymore.  
 A league can generate more competition with an appropriate packaging (13).50 
 The number of live games (14) offered by the league can also increase competition. 
 Timing (15) is also important: should a league negotiate TV rights just before a new 
period or earlier? 
 
 
 Eventually, the league also needs to be able to allocate as many TV rights as possible 
to its clubs (no or limited need to allocate a part of them to clubs in other divisions / 
sports), which is related to its independence (16). As mentioned in the previous 
section, French TV rights are shared not only between first division clubs but also 
with second division clubs and amateur sport. Eventually, only 78% of national TV 
rights are for Ligue 1 clubs. By contrast, the EPL is independent since its breakaway 
with lower professional divisions in 1992. This does not mean that 100% of national 
TV rights are for EPL clubs. Indeed, since the breakaway, the EPL has provided a 
small amount to maintain clubs’ youth-development programmes and, since 2001, it 
has sliced a percentage of its TV deals to the Football Foundation, principally to 
improve neglected football facilities nationwide.51 Parachute payments are also 
distributed to clubs relegated from the EPL. In this article, the amounts under 
consideration are those going to EPL and Ligue 1 clubs, not the overall TV rights 
before distribution. 
Methodology 
Based on the previous criteria, the objective is to compare the evolution of TV rights in 
English and French football over the 1980-2020 period. Although no TV rights were paid for 
live matches before 1983, the criteria will be analysed for the 1980-1983 sub-period. The 
reason is that TV rights for a given period are related, among other causes, to the quality of a 
league and what happened in terms of TV competition during the previous period. The 
methodology is based on correlations between TV rights and their possible explanatory 
variables. Some have explicit values (e.g. attendance) but for most of them, it is necessary to 
consider whether a criterion is met or not, allocating a value according to this (1 if met, 0 if 
not). As some criteria are not fully met, not fully not met, they will be allocated 0.5. Data 
 
 
come from Gratton and Solberg, The Swiss Rample and Vrooman for the EPL,52 and LNF 
(Ligue Nationale de Football) / LFP (Ligue de Football Professionnel) reports for the Ligue 
1,53 unless specified otherwise. Financial data being presented in euros, exchange rates are 
applied to amounts initially in pounds, based on the website fxtop.com.54 So as to evaluate as 
objectively as possible the different variables, clear and consistent rules have to be set: 
(1) Quality of foreign players: 1 if best players in the world, 0.5 if not all best players in 
the world, 0 otherwise. 
(2) Quality of domestic players: 1 if evidence (qualification for the main national team 
competitions, the FIFA World Cup and the UEFA Euro) and best domestic players in 
the domestic league, 0.5 if evidence but not all best domestic players in the domestic 
league, 0 if no evidence or evidence but most of the best players not in the domestic 
league. 
(3) TV channel’s financial ability: turnover (official reports for Sky, several sources for 
Canal +).55 
(4) Football domestic league = core product: audiences. 
(5) Ability to attract investors and revenues beyond TV rights: 1 if dominant league from 
an economic point of view without taking into account TV rights or evidence of large 
investments, 0.5 if ability without being the dominant league or evidence of large 
investments, 0 otherwise. 
(6) Stadium attendance: data from European Football Statistics.56 
(7) Continental competitiveness: UEFA ranking from Kassies.57 
(8) Competition between TV channels: 1 if at least three competitors, 0.5 if two, 0 if only 
one. 




(10) Convincing domestic rivals so as to generate uncertainty for the title: 1 if at least two 
rivals or only one rival but with high potential (e.g. high attendance / big city), 0.5 if 
only one rival with limited potential (e.g. low attendance / small city), 0 if not. 
(11) Appropriate number of clubs: this depends on several factors such as the position of 
the league and its best clubs in the economic continental hierarchy since a strongly 
dominant league can have more clubs sharing its TV rights without compromising its 
best clubs’ economic position; or the number of weekends / holidays when matchdays 
can be organised (e.g. Boxing Day in the UK). 
(12) Markets with high potential for TV rights: 1 if Asia and the United States are reached, 
0.5 if only one of these two markets is reached or none of them but some others with 
good potential (e.g. France for the English Premier League), 0 otherwise. As an 
alternative for the quality of foreign players and players from markets with potential 
for TV rights, we also consider the percentage of foreign players.58 This percentage is 
supposed to have been highly impacted by the Bosman Case (1995). 
(13) Packaging: number of packages. 
(14) Number of live games. 
(15) Timing: how long before the period covered has a deal been agreed? It is worth noting 
that timing impacts the information that has to be taken into account for our criteria. 
Indeed, if TV rights in period t were negotiated one year before the new deal, the last 
season of period t-1 has not to be considered since it cannot influence these TV rights; 
if TV rights depend on the number of current TV viewers as it was the case in French 
football between 1984 and 1987,59 this is period t that has to be taken into account to 
explain TV rights in t. 
(16) Independence: 1 if met or to come, 0.5 if signs that this could occur, 0 if not. 
 
 
For the criteria taking the values 1, 0.5 or 0, the decision to allocate a specific value 
can be straightforward or a matter of qualitative assessment based on available and collected 
evidence. Such evidence is available as supplemental file (see Appendices 1 to 4) so that the 
reader can understand the rationale behind our choices. 
Results and Discussion 
Brief Description of the Evolution of TV Rights over the 1980-2020 Period 
First of all, we briefly describe the evolution of TV rights going to English and French men’s 
football first division clubs over the 1980-2020 period. Figure 1 shows the huge increase for 
England, particularly from 2007-2008 with the gap with France having always increased 
since then (the decrease for England in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 is due to the parity pound-
euro, not an actual decrease in pounds since annual TV rights were the same over the 2007-
2010 period; the same applies from 2017-2018). From 1992-1993 to 2006-2007, TV rights 
were always larger in England than France but the latter was able to partially fill the gap 
when it increased. It is difficult to really know how TV rights evolved before 1997 based on 
Figure 1. This is the reason why Figure 2 focuses on the 1980-1997 period only. During the 
latter, TV rights were much closer between the two leagues with the French league being able 
to fill the gap appeared in 1992-1993 – when the Premier League was created and Sky won 







Data and Correlations 
Table 1 provides the data related to TV rights and their supposed explanatory variables (n = 
27 observations; 13 for England and 14 for France). It must be noted that all annual domestic 
audiences could not be found. As a consequence, all average domestic audiences could not be 
calculated, this is the reason why they are not reported here. However, domestic audiences 
are discussed in a dedicated subsection later. Data for TV rights, timing, number of live 
games, packages and clubs are those for t+1. Indeed, TV rights in t+1 are determined mainly 
by elements in t, except for those specified here and in France from 1984 to 1987 (see 
explanation for timing in the methodology section). Because the timing may be at another 
time that the very end of period t (e.g. one year before), the data likely to explain TV rights in 
t+1 and as such taken into account for period t do not include those after the timing (i.e. the 
last season of period t when the timing is one year before the end of period t). Based on the 
elements in Table 1, one might have the feeling that most of the explanatory variables have 
improved in parallel with TV rights, especially for England. The best way to confirm this is 
to observe the correlations between variables. 
Table 1 
Table 2 shows that most of the explanatory variables have a significant positive 
impact on TV rights (the negative sign for UEFA ranking means a positive impact as it is 
better to be ranked 1st than 2nd which is better than 3rd and so on). The variables that have not 
a significant impact on TV rights are the number of live games, the quality of domestic 
players, driving force, domestic rivals, the number of clubs and an appropriate number of 
clubs. For driving force and domestic rivals, a main reason is that almost all periods have a 
value equal to 1, meaning that these two variables are not sufficiently discriminating in 
England and France over time. For the number of clubs, a reason is that 20 clubs in England 
 
 
is not the same as 20 clubs in France given their respective situation (England more likely to 
share TV rights between 20 clubs with limited economic impact on its best clubs regarding its 
economic position and its independence) and more attractive possibilities for broadcasting 
games in England due to the absence of a winter lull. When considering an appropriate 
number of clubs for England alone, there is a significant positive impact. There is also a 
significant positive impact of the number of live games for England alone. Interestingly, there 
is a significant negative impact of the quality of domestic players for France alone. An 
explanation is that TV rights increased after the 1998 World Cup in and won by France but 
also after the Euro 2000 also won by France, whereas most of its best players left the 
domestic league after the Bosman Case in 1995. This could translate an increase in football 
demand from French people due to France national men’s football team success, independent 
of whether the best French players operate in the domestic league or not. This interpretation 
is consistent with the increase in overall audiences for the French football first division over 
the 1998-2002 period, when 306 games were broadcast per season (all games with 18 clubs): 
from 49m in 1998-1999 to 92m in 2001-2002 (almost doubled). 
Table 2 
Main TV Channel’s Turnover 
The explanatory variable with the strongest correlation with TV rights is the main TV 
channel’s turnover. Figure 3 shows the evolution of the turnover for Sky in the UK and 
Ireland and Canal+ in France over the 1990-2016 period, from more than six times larger for 
Canal+ in 1990-1991 to more than six times larger for Sky in the UK and Ireland in 2015-
2016. The very strong correlation between TV rights and main TV channel’s turnover 
suggests the possibility of a virtuous circle: broadcasting football games allows a TV channel 
to increase its customer base and its turnover, meaning that it can invest in turn more money 
 
 
in football so that clubs can attract better players (consistent with the strong correlation 
between the main TV channel’s turnover and the percentage of foreign players, the strongest 
between explanatory variables), increasing the attractiveness of the league and thus new 
customers for the TV channel. This is what happened in English football (even if Sky 
decreased its investment for the 2004-2007 period when it did not face competition) but not 
in French football. A reason is competition between English and French football, with the 
latter not able to spend as much money in players as the former. This means that English 
clubs can attract the best players operating in the French league. It is worth noting that 
English clubs can rely not only on large domestic TV rights but also large international TV 
rights, including from France and, until 2016, Canal+. Thus, the French TV group provided 
€63m per season for the EPL over the 2013-2016 period.  
Figure 3 
Domestic Audiences 
As written earlier, we could not find all annual domestic audiences. Nevertheless, some of 
them could be accessed over the 1996-2014 period (Table 3). From 2000-2001 to 2003-2004, 
overall audiences for France were larger than England but its average audiences were four to 
five times smaller. In 2004-2005 and 2005-2006, overall audiences were even smaller for 
France in spite of much more broadcast games for which data were available (380 versus 88 
for England). In 2006-2007, overall audiences were again larger for France then the number 
of TV audiences available for England increased (to 137 in 2007-2008) and even if this 
number was still smaller than France, overall audiences for England were larger again. The 
fact that the French Professional League (LFP) has stopped the publication of Ligue 1 overall 
audiences from 2008-2009 lets think that they have decreased compared to 2007-2008. In 
2012-2013, the average audience for the main game of each matchday (38 games) decreased 
 
 
to 1.1m in Ligue 1, an average not strongly larger than the one for the 154 broadcast games 
(four times more games) in EPL in 2013-2014. This is consistent with the idea that EPL has 
much more games with high potential for large audiences than the French Ligue 1. In the 
French context, it is also important to consider the development of the rugby Top 14, able to 
achieve an average domestic audience for all its games (not only for the main game of each 
matchday) between 700,000 and 800,000 over the 2008-2013 period in spite of days or at 
least times not as optimal as for football.60 Top 14 average audiences were slightly decreasing 
in 2013-2014, a decrease mainly due to ‘a very strong competition from the Premier League 
that year’.61 
Table 3 
Conclusion: English Premier League’s Virtuous Circle 
This article aimed at comparing the evolution of TV rights in English and French men’s 
football first divisions over the 1980-2020 period. It showed that a lot of explanatory 
variables for the amount of TV rights are positively correlated, suggesting the existence of a 
virtuous circle, at least for the English Premier League. Such a virtuous circle is represented 
in Figure 4. This can be simplified as follows: independence and competition between TV 
channels => more money => better clubs => more potential live games => more competition 
between TV channels => more money. Before commenting further on Figure 5, it is worth 
mentioning that English club football was in a very bad situation in the 1980s: attendances 
were falling down (from more than 31,000 in 1972 to less than 19,000 in 1984) due to old 
stadia and hooliganism; English clubs have been banned from European competitions for five 
years following the Heysel disaster in 1985; and the Hillsborough disaster in 1989 was the 
most serious tragedy in UK sporting history. The latter induced the Taylor Report,62 which 
eventually led to all-seat arenas from 1994-1995. The Taylor Report was one determining 
 
 
factor triggering the English Premier League success, along with English clubs coming back 
in European competitions in 1990 (meaning that top positions in the league could qualify 
again for continental competitions), and independence and Sky winning TV rights in 1992. 
Figure 4 
The Bosman Case (1995) and the Euro 1996 in England were two other beneficial 
factors during the 1990s as was the evolution of the Champions League from only one club 
per country (except if its winner was not champion in its domestic league) to four clubs for 
the best countries from 1999, along with more money shared on the basis of the TV pool (TV 
domestic market) rather than sporting performance and equality between countries. In 2003, 
Sky faced no competition for national TV rights that slightly decreased for the period 2004-
2007 in spite of more than twice more broadcast games. This was ‘seen by many as an 
indicator that the boom time for broadcasting rights was over’.63 However, the European 
Commission insisted that at least one of the packages offered for the 2007-2010 period went 
to a different broadcaster. This generated again competition between TV channels which is 
even more intense with BT being in the market since 2012. Coupled with more international 
TV rights, these elements explain the English Premier League’s virtuous circle. 
Some questions for the future are whether the English Premier League will sustain 
this virtuous circle on the long term while domestic TV rights will decrease over the 2019-
2022 period and the French Ligue 1 will generate such a virtuous circle following the arrival 
of Neymar at Paris-Saint-Germain in 2017. For the latter, domestic TV rights will 
considerably increase over the 2020-2024 period (€1.153bn per year, +60%), with MediaPro 
and BeIN Sports putting Canal + out of the broadcasters.64 It remains to observe whether 
international TV rights will enjoy a similar increase while a deal has been agreed with BeIN 
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Figure 1. Evolution of TV rights going to English and French men’s football first division 
clubs, 1980-2020. 
 









































































































Figure 3. Evolution of the turnover for Sky in the UK and Ireland and Canal+ in France, 
1990-2016 (in €m). 
 
 
Circled components are connected to each other; the same applies to framed components; this is also the case for 
components in bold. 
Figure 4. English Premier League’s virtuous circle: positive influence of independence, 




















































































































































































England                   
1980-83 4.56 0 10 1 0 1 0 0.5 20127 3 0 1 1 22 0 0 2% 0 
1983-85 7.39 0 10 1 0 1 0 0.5 21080 1 0 1 1 22 0 0 1% 0 
1985-86 2.28 0 6 1 0 0 0 0 19563 33 0 1 1 22 0 0 2% 0 
1985-86 4.63 0 14 1 0 0 0 0 19563 33 0 1 1 22 0 0 2% 0 
1986-88 16.12 0 18 1 0 0 1428.31 0 19273 33 0.5 1 1 20 1 0 1% 0.5 
1988-92 64.10 0 60 1 0 1 1850.56 0.5 21622 13 1 1 1 22 0 0 3% 1 
1992-97 322.16 1 60 1 0.5 1 1967.62 1 27550 7 1 1 1 20 1 0.5 34% 1 
1997-01 809.77 1 106 2 0.5 1 2920.11 1 30757 5 1 1 1 20 1 0.5 40% 1 
2001-04 671.76 1 138 4 0.5 0.5 4837.94 1 34448 2 0 1 1 20 1 1 50% 1 
2004-07 978.46 1 138 6 0.5 1 6076.82 1 33864 3 1 1 1 20 1 1 55% 1 
2007-10 1217.94 1.5 138 6 0.5 1 6490.78 1 35614 1 1 1 1 20 1 1 61% 1 
2010-13 2078.72 1 154 7 0.5 1 8101.66 1 34600 1 1 1 1 20 1 1 65% 1 
2013-16 2937.64 1.5 168 7 0.5 0.75 9597.89 1 36179 2 1 1 1 20 1 1 68% 1 
France                   
1980-83 0.3 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 10886 8 0 1 1 20 1 0 10% 0 
1983-84 0.8 0 0 1 0 0.5 0 0.5 10084 10 0 1 1 20 1 0 10% 0 
1984-85 1.32 0 6 1 0.5 0.5 41.31 0.5 9906 11 0 1 1 20 1 0 10% 0 
1985-86 5.5 0 25 1 0.5 0.5 189.42 0.5 10156 15 0 1 1 20 1 0 10% 0 
1986-87 9.9 0 25 1 0.5 0 403.38 0.5 11425 14 0 1 1 20 1 0 10% 0 
1986-87 15.25 0 38 1 0.5 0 403.38 0.5 11425 14 0 1 1 20 1 0 10% 0 
1987-92 45.3 0 106.4 1 0.5 1 1345.75 0.5 11493 5 0 1 1 20 1 0 10% 0 
1992-97 92.4 0 306 1 0 0 1645.69 0 14163 3 0 1 1 18 1 0 18% 0 
1997-99 220.6 0 343 4 0 0 1615.96 0 19941 4 0.5 1 1 18 1 0 22% 0 
1999-04 368 2 380 3 0.5 0 1525 0 21755 5 0.5 0 1 20 0 0.5 31% 0 
1999-05 475 0.5 380 4 0.5 0 1523.25 0 20178 5 0.5 1 0.5 20 0 0.5 36% 0 
2005-08 506 0.5 380 12 0.5 0 1748 0 21841 5 0.5 1 0.5 20 0 0.5 33% 0 
2008-12 500 1 380 11 0.5 0 1822 1 19742 5 0.5 1 1 20 0 0.5 38% 0 
2012-16 628 2 380 6 0.5 0 1856 1 20953 6 0.5 1 0.5 20 0 0.5 41% 0 
 
 




































































0.83** 0.87** 0.61** 0.63** 
Timing for 
TV rights in 
t+1 




  0.68** 0.34 -0.42* 0.23 -0.10 0.21 -0.45* 0.31 -0.33 -0.60** -0.51** -0.33 0.39* 0.49** 0.78** -0.12 
Number of 
packages t+1 








     0.41* 0.61** 0.44* -0.44* 0.40* 0.20 0.36 0.28 0.27 0.30 0.24 -0.02 0.63** 
Turnover       0.58** 0.85** -0.44* 0.71** 0.05 0.06 -0.23 0.33 0.88** 0.89** 0.63** 0.78** 
Economic 
position 
       0.54** -0.49** 0.46* 0.26 0.17 -0.01 0.33 0.62** 0.62** 0.33 0.64** 
Attendance         -0.36 0.75** -0.02 0.002 0.04 0.04 0.88** 0.81** 0.68** 0.83** 
UEFA 
ranking 
         -0.31 0.09 0.14 0.39* -0.14 -0.51** -0.59** -0.59** -0.24 
Competition           -0.05 -0.09 -0.12 0.07 0.68** 0.69** 0.63** 0.77** 
Driving force            -0.07 0.04 0.26 -0.09 -0.06 -0.19 0.14 
Domestic 
rivals 
            0.08 0.46* -0.17 -0.20 -0.34 0.25 
Number of 
clubs 




              0.13 0.22 0.03 0.36 
Internatio-nal 
markets 
               0.96** 0.78** 0.70** 
% of foreign 
players 
                0.85** 0.63** 
Bosman case                  0.42* 




Table 3. Domestic audiences in English and French men’s football first divisions, 1996-2014 
(in million). 
 England France 
 Overall Games1 Average Overall Games Average 
1996-1997 91.2 60 1.52 - - - 
1997-1998 - - - - - - 
1998-1999 - - - 49.2 306 0.16 
1999-2000 - - - 57.5 306 0.19 
2000-2001 65.4 60 1.09 83.0 306 0.27 
2001-2002 77.2 66 1.17 92.1 306 0.30 
2002-2003 89.8 66 1.36 104.5 380 0.28 
2003-2004 89.8 66 1.36 105.5 380 0.28 
2004-2005 107.4 88 1.22 105.6 380 0.28 
2005-2006 106.5 88 1.21 103.7 380 0.27 
2006-2007 103.8 88 1.18 111.3 380 0.29 
2007-2008 134.3 137 0.98 112.5 380 0.30 
2008-20092 - - - 64.6 38 1.7 
2009-20102 - - - 57.0 38 1.5 
2010-20112 - - - 60.8 38 1.6 
2011-20122 - - - 53.2 38 1.4 
2012-20132 - - - 41.8 38 1.1 
2013-2014 160.9 154 1.04 -  - 
1 Data not available for all games for England, explaining some differences compared to the number of games 
broadcast. 
2 Main game of each matchday only. 
Sources: Autorité de la concurrence, Buraimo and Simmons, Gratton and Solberg, Harris and LNF / LFP. 
Autorité de la Concurrence, ‘Décision n° 14-MC-01’; Buraimo and Simmons, ‘Uncertainty of 
Outcome or Star Quality?’; Gratton and Solberg, The Economics of Sports Broadcasting, 34-35; 
Nick Harris, ‘Man United and Liverpool Remain Top TV Draws Despite 2013-14 Without 
Trophies’, Sporting Intelligence, July 21, 2014, 
http://www.sportingintelligence.com/2014/07/21/man-united-and-liverpool-remain-top-tv-




Appendix 1. TV rights and characteristics of English and French football first divisions, 1980-1987. 
 1980-1983 1983-1984 1984-1985 1985-1986 1986-1987 
 England France England France England France England France England France 
Annual TV 
rights / domestic 
competition 
£1.67m (€3.04m)1 









BBC & ITV 
€1.32m1 




TF1 & Canal + 
£3.15m (€4.8m) 
BBC & ITV 
€9.9m1 
TF1 & Canal + 
Timing rights 
t+1 
1983 1982 or 1983 1983 1984-1985 1985 1985-1986 1986 1986-1987 1988 1987 
Driving force(s) Liverpool 
Saint-Etienne 
(till 82) 




Aston Villa (champion 



































United (only 11 







British record transfer 
fee = £1.5m in 1981 
(Robson, Manchester 
United) vs £3m for 
Maradona from Boca 
Juniors to FC 
Barcelona in 1982 
Bez (Bordeaux) 
Tottenham first 






Tottenham on the 
stock exchange 










£6m for Gullit 
from PSV 
Eindhoven to 





Good UEFA ranking 
with a limited number 
of foreign players 
A few players abroad 
Semi-finalist in 
1982 World Cup 
Six abroad 
except in 1981, 
Platini abroad 
from 1982 
Platini 3rd Ballon 
d’or 1980, 4th 
1981, 9th 1982 
Giresse 2nd 1982 
Good UEFA 




A few players 
abroad 
Dalglish 2nd 






ranking with a 
limited number of 
foreign players 
A few players 
abroad 
Rush 4th Ballon 
d’or 1984 
Qualification for 
1986 World Cup 
after Euro 1984 
winner 
Platini and Six 
abroad 
Tigana 2nd 
Ballon d’or 1984 
England 5-8 
1986 World Cup 
A few players 
abroad but 
departures to 
come after the 
1986 World Cup 
Semi-finalist in 
1986 World Cup 




for Euro 1988 
Some of the best 
players abroad 
 

























































1 Authors’ estimation. 2 Initially £4.75m refused by clubs. 3 UK and Irish players instead of English players only for England as national TV rights are sold to UK and Irish channels. 
 
 
Appendix 2. TV rights and characteristics of English and French football first divisions, 1987-2001. 
 1987-1988 1988-1992 1992-1997 1997-1999 1999-2001 
 England France England France 
England 1992-
1996 













TF1 & Canal + 
£11m (€16.1m) 
ITV (vs BBC and satellite 
TV operator), BSkyB to 
come 
International to come 
€15.25m 


























Canal + & TPS 
Timing 
rights t+1 
1988 1987 1992 1992 1996 1997 2000 1999 2000  End of 2002 
Driving 
force(s) 
Liverpool Bordeaux Liverpool Marseille 
Manchester 
United 








39,152 vs 39,582 






Arsenal (champion 1989 












































Manchester United 2nd 
club on the stock 
exchange in 1991 (worth 
£18m) 
£8m for Baggio from 






1 in Europe in 
1996-1997 




keep their best 
players 












1 in Europe 









England 7-8 Euro 
1988 
Some of the best 
players abroad 
Not qualified for Euro 
1988 
Platini retired, Six 
abroad 
England semi-finalist in 
1990 World Cup, Ireland 
in quarter-finals 
Scotland 5-6, England 7-
8 Euro 1992 
A few players abroad 
Shilton 5th Ballon d’or 












finalist in Euro 
1996 (at home) 
Ince and 
Gascoigne abroad 




A few players 
abroad before 
Euro 1996 and 
Bosman case, 
much more after 
England in round of 
16 in 1998 World 
Cup (all men 
playing in England 


































/ continents, not Asia, 
North and Central 
America 
Burruchaga, Förster 
and Allofs (West 
Germany), Hateley 
and Hoddle (England) 











34% of foreign 
players in 1995-
1996 




18% of foreign 
players in 1995-
1996 
37% of foreign 
players in 1998-
1999 
















From 22% to 




1 Authors’ estimation. 2 ‘Club Europe’: Bordeaux, Lens, Lyon, Marseille, Monaco and Paris. 3 UK and Irish players instead of English players only for England as national TV rights are sold to UK and Irish channels. 
 
 
Appendix 3. TV rights and characteristics of English and French football first divisions, 2001-2008. 
 2001-2002 2002-2004 2004-2005 2005-2007 2007-2008 















€40m for ‘Club 
Europe’1) 
Canal + & TPS 
£522.9m (€794m) 
£463.9m BSkyB (no 
competition to come) 
+ highlights ITV 
£59m international 
€200m (+ €40m for 
‘Club Europe’1 in 
2002-2003) 





































2003 End of 2002 2003 End of 2002 2006 End of 2004 2006 Start of 2008 2009 Start of 2008 
Driving 
force(s) 











Lyon, Lens, Auxerre, 
Paris SG, Lille 
Arsenal (champion 
2004) 






- (Lille first 
















1 in Europe 
Canal + (Paris SG) 
Pathé (Lyon) 
1 in Europe, 
Abramovitch 
(Chelsea, 2003) 
Canal + (Paris SG) 
Pathé (Lyon) 












on the stock 
exchange 
(2007) 
1 in Europe, 
Thaksin 
(Manchester 










finals in 2002 
World Cup (only 
Hargreaves 
playing abroad) 
Owen Ballon d’or 
2001, Beckham 4th 
Eliminated in first 
round in 2002 World 
Cup with 18/23 players 
abroad 
England in quarter-























finals in 2006 World 
Cup (Hargreaves and 
Beckham abroad) 
Lampard 2nd and 






No UK teams / 
Ireland in Euro 
2008 but 10 
English first-




in first round 







From 37% to 56% 
of foreign players 
from 1998-1999 to 
2004-2005, Asia 
From 22% to 36% of 




From 37% to 56% of 
foreign players from 
1998-1999 to 2004-
2005 
Henry 2nd Ballon 
d’or 2003 
From 22% to 36% 
of foreign players 
from 1998-1999 to 
2004-2005 







55% of foreign 
players in 2005-2006 
Henry 4th Ballon d’or 














1 ‘Club Europe’: Bordeaux, Lens, Lyon, Marseille, Monaco and Paris. 2 Canal + won exclusive TV rights in November 2002 for the 2004-2007 period but this was cancelled by the French Competition Council in January 
2003. 3 UK and Irish players instead of English players only for England as national TV rights are sold to UK and Irish channels. 
 
 
Appendix 4. TV rights and characteristics of English and French football first divisions, 2008-2020. 
 2008-2010 2010-2012 2012-2013 2013-2016 2016-2020 (2019 for England) 














£555.6m BSkyB & 
Setanta then ESPN 
















Orange to stop, 
decrease in number of 
subscribers for Canal 




€468.5m Canal + 





£899.2m Sky & 





€468.5m Canal + 












€585m Canal + 
& BeIN Sports 




Start of 2009 2011 2012 2011 Start of 2015 2014 Start of 2015 2014 Start of 2018 2018 
Driving 
force(s) 
Manchester United Lyon 
Manchester 
United 



















































Authority (Paris SG) 

















England in round of 
16 in 2010 World 
Cup (all 23 players 
in England) 
Eliminated in 











Ballon d’or 2011 
Quarter-finals in Euro 
2012 (11/23 players 
abroad) 
England qualified 
for 2014 World 




2014 World Cup 





first round in 
2014 World Cup 
(only 1 player 
abroad, Forster) 
but winning all 





2014 World Cup 
(15/23 players 
abroad) 
England in round 
of 16 in Euro 
2016 (all 23 
players in 
England) 
 Bale (Wales) 
abroad 







From 60 to 68% of 
foreign players 
from 2007-2008 to 
2013-2014 
Cristiano Ronaldo 
Ballon d’or 2008, 











From 37 to 41% of 




From 60 to 68% of 
foreign players 
from 2007-2008 to 
2013-2014 





Paris SG effect 
68% of foreign 
players in 2013-
2014 
41% of foreign 
players (40% in 
2014-2015) 
Ibrahimovic 4th 
Ballon d’or 2013, 
Falcao, James 
Rodriguez 
Around 70% of 
foreign players 
Around 40% of 
foreign players 
Neymar 5th 
Ballon d’or 2016, 
3rd 2017 
1 Authors’ estimation. 2 UK and Irish players instead of English players only for England as national TV rights are sold to UK and Irish channels. 
